Mirage: Targeted Jailbreaks Against Post-Generation Safety Checkers in Multimodal Diffusion Models

Post-generation safety checkers are widely employed in diffusion-model pipelines to prevent unsafe generated content from reaching users.

In this paper, we show that these safety checkers can still be bypassed by our proposed multimodal jailbreak attack, Mirage.

Given an adversarial target, which can be either a reference NSFW image or a malicious text description, Mirage conceals the target within an imperceptible perturbation applied to a benign input image.

Mirage exploits the shared representation space of multimodal encoders to jointly align the perturbed image with the cross-modal adversarial target while repelling its representation from commonly filtered NSFW concepts.

Such semantic separation can transfer across representation spaces, enabling Mirage to evade heterogeneous safety checkers without accessing their internal details.

We further employ lightweight black-box query refinement to improve evasion near the unknown safety boundary.

We implemented Mirage on Stable Diffusion 1.5, Stable Diffusion XL, and Kandinsky 2.2, and evaluated it on two cross-modal NSFW datasets, covering both text-to-image and image-to-image generation scenarios.

The experimental results demonstrate that Mirage achieves strong targeted jailbreak performance across diverse post-generation safety checkers with limited black-box queries while preserving high semantic alignment with the adversarial targets.